Many people were taken aback by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Were you surprised?
The escalation of the crisis came as no surprise to me. What was unusual was that President Putin was remarkably open about what he wanted and thereby forced the West into an initial round of crisis diplomacy. Besides, it’s not as if Russia surprised the West with a fait accompli on the military level. Putin amassed a full-scale intervention force over the course of many weeks. In parallel, he tightened his grip on civil society and the Russian press. Obviously, there was no way Ukraine and the West could accept Russia’s maximum demands. But, at the same time, it became increasingly clear that there was a serious probability of military intervention on an unknown scale.
How do you explain the timing of the attack?
For one thing, Putin seems to be under the impression that time is running out for him to cement his political legacy. The way he sees it, Russia’s place is back at the table with the other great powers. And he expects those powers to show respect for Russia’s own ambitions in this sphere. But under President Zelenskiy’s leadership, Ukraine has shifted more and more towards the West. At the same time, the mass demonstrations in Belarus have forced President Lukashenko to close ranks with Putin. In other words, there’s been a lot happening in Putin’s “Russian sphere of influence”. For another thing, Putin likely saw it as a favourable moment on the international level. For example, the US government was still subject to infighting, and in terms of foreign policy, the Biden administration cut a poor figure with its hasty retreat from Afghanistan. Europe, for its part, was absorbed in its own affairs, and with the departure of Angela Merkel, the last link to the old West vanished. Meanwhile, Russia has stepped up its partnership with China.
Could the West have avoided war by taking more decisive action?
That’s the subject of intense debate among experts in the US. President Biden has been criticised for his early announcement that NATO would not be sending troops to Ukraine. The argument is that the massive build-up of Russian troops should have been met much earlier by a countervailing military force. In my view, these charges fall short of the mark. They are too narrowly military in their thinking and overlook the fact that the Europeans would not have fallen into line with such a policy.
Has anything surprised you about the early phase of combat?
Three things surprised me: the hesitancy of the Russian military campaign; the unexpectedly staunch resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces, along with the indomitable spirit shown by the Ukrainian people; and finally, the rapid, coordinated and unexpectedly tough countermeasures adopted by the US and Europe. Everything that has happened so far is the result of these three factors and the interplay between them.
How do you explain that?
The difficulties encountered by the Russian army are down to strategic, operational and tactical shortcomings. By contrast, the Ukrainian leadership has fought a well-planned information war, along with all the drawbacks that entails. By pursuing a skilful strategy of political internationalisation, it has unleashed a broad wave of solidarity. For now, it remains unclear just what role covert military support from the US has played in the battlefield successes to date. Moreover, a key factor in the West’s response is that the US has let Europe take the political lead and instead focused on bolstering NATO’s deterrence and defence capabilities.
Can we already foresee the medium- and long-term consequences of the war for international relations?
A lot depends on how it progresses. As ever, the medium- and long-term consequences will become visible only once the “fog of war” has lifted from the conflict zone and domestic political debates have calmed down somewhat. We’ve still some way to go before that.
Could the war mark the beginning of the end for Putin?
Right now, very different outcomes of the war are possible, each with different consequences for Russia. In the long run, it may indeed turn out that the war heralded the end of Putin’s regime. And then it might well become possible to launch a dialogue on the future of the European security order and a new chapter in Russo-European relations. At present, however, it looks more likely that Putin will hold onto power, with Russia internationally isolated and Ukraine facing years of insurgency. In this scenario, relations between the West and Russia would be governed by the logic of deterrence for the foreseeable future. In turn, Russia would move even further eastwards, and the strategic partnership with China would probably deepen.
